Extremism in PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, the relation between Islam and state has been a matter of great controversy. From the time of its inception, the opinion in the country has remained divided as to whether Pakistan is to be an Islamic/‘shariah’ state or a ‘modern’/‘secular’ Muslim-majority state.

The roots of this controversy could be traced to the various statements of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, which he gave during the independence movement and at the time of the emergence of Pakistan.

For example, in his 1940-article entitled “The Constitutional Future of India”, Jinnah stated:

“The British people, being Christians, sometimes forget the religious wars of their own history and today consider religion as a private and personal matter between man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam, for these religions are definite social codes which govern not so much man’s relations with his God as man’s relations with his neighbor. They govern not only his law and culture, but every aspect of his social life, and such religions, essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought on which Western democracy is based, and inevitably bring about vertical rather than the horizontal divisions democracy envisages.” [1]

In marked contrast to the opinion expressed in the above-mentioned article, Jinnah as the designated Governor-General stated in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947:

“ . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed . . . that has nothing to do with the business of the state . . . We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.” He added, “. . .you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in political sense, as citizens of the state.” [2] The ‘two-nation theory’ had served its purpose and was duly repudiated. The two ‘nations’ __ Hindus and Muslims ___ were once again to be regarded as two ‘communities’ after independence.

Jinnah’s pronouncement of 11 August 1947 explicitly envisaged creation of a secular state in Pakistan. In doing so he was representing religious diversity of Pakistani society and plurality of Pakistani culture.

But the Ulema (Clergy) considered it a betrayal of the cause for which the South Asian subcontinent was partitioned into two sovereign states. Since then the ‘Objectives Resolution’ of 1949, the 22 Points of the Ulema framed in 1951, the anti-Ahmediya agitation of 1953, the ‘Islamic’ provisions of the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973, including the declaration of the Ahmediya community as being outside the pale of Islam through a constitutional amendment in 1974, General Zia’s ‘Islamization’ program and the ‘jihadi’ culture have reflected the conflicts and compromises between the adherents of diverse opinions as to the role of Islam in Pakistan.

Notwithstanding popular aspiration to establish some form of Islamic polity___ a legacy of the freedom struggle ____ the ethos of Pakistani society did not reflect religious extremism, at least till 1979.

In fact the society was prepared to accept many liberties in every-day life that the strict observance of Shariah would have denied it.

With economic development and exposure to foreign influences, it was opening up to modernism and adopting many western values. Ayub Khan’s period would be particularly known for this trend, for he had a penchant to modernize Pakistani society and his Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 is a testimony to the fact.

One has nostalgia for the social scene of the 1960s. There was no bar on performing arts, provided the presentations were apolitical.

The cinema halls offered latest Pakistani, Indian and Hollywood movies that as a part of urban culture were watched by families in decent environment.

Almost every urban locality had its wine shops and some sort of mini clubs for the youth. For the elite, the gymkhanas and nightclubs in the cities offered good venues to enjoy liquor, gambling and dancing.

There used to be prominent advertisements of floorshows with semi nude photographs of foreign performers in the newspapers. The racecourses attracted a lot of people on weekends.

The rich organized New Year parties without any hinder. Musical shows and functions without any impediment. Foreign tourists thronged the market places in the cities. Co-educational institutions were mushrooming.

The programs of Qawwali, (a form of recitation of Sufi poetry in the traditions of Hazrat Amir Khusro-the renowned Mystique and inventor of this form of religious rendition in praise of Allah, Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), and religious saints), was quite normal and used to draw huge audiences. Besides, rendition of Urdu Poetry in the well entrenched form of Mushaira was built into our lives and used to be a great form of _expression of our culture and traditions. The city life, particularly big cities like Karachi and Lahore, were known for these traditional forms of _expression of our aesthetic values.

The Coffee shops were built in to our day to day lives and were venues of diverse political, social and cultural debates, discourses and discussions. In short, there was no transformation in urban or rural culture that could have been specifically attributed to the creation of Pakistan in the name of Islam. Alas the traumatic events of 1971, culminating in the abject surrender of Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan, did jolt the nation. Since the military ruler of the time, General Yahya Khan, and some of his close associates were notorious as drunkards and womanizers, the people blamed their waywardness as responsible for the disaster.

In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, the unruly mobs attacked and burnt wine shops, nightclubs and cinema houses to vent their shock and grief. In this passing phase, there was much talk about the East Pakistan catastrophe as being a divine retribution for nation’s sins in deviating from the path of Islam and the dire need to revert back to what was popularly perceived as the real raison d’etre of Pakistan. With East Pakistan gone, Pakistan lost much of its religious diversity. Under pressure from the religious parties, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who assumed power after the East Pakistan debacle, agreed to declare Islam the state religion of Pakistan in the Constitution of 1973.

He used the Islamic Summit Conference held at Lahore in February 1974 to project himself as one of the foremost leaders of the Islamic world. He also consented to declare the Ahmediya community as non-Muslim through a constitutional amendment in September 1974 after serious riots broke out on the issue.

By adopting such measures, Bhutto wanted to strengthen his Islamic credentials vis-à-vis ethno-regional and religious parties and compensate for his failure to deliver on economic front. But despite all this, Bhutto was never averse to cultural permissiveness and the ethos of Pakistani society did not undergo any change on that count.

His social liberalism was anathema to religious parties and the Casino, which Bhutto planned to construct on the Clifton beach, became a symbol of Bhutto’s cultural openness.

Considering himself firmly entrenched in the office, Bhutto advised President Fazle Elahi Chaudhry in the first week of January 1977 to dissolve the National Assembly and appoint 7 March as the date for next general elections.

In no time the hitherto divided opposition joined hands to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to confront Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party from a single platform.

In his desire to secure two-third majority that could have enabled him to amend the Constitution, Bhutto and his erstwhile colleagues and the then administration went for the overkill and the elections were massively rigged.

The PNA declined to accept the results and demanded resignation of Bhutto and holding of fresh elections under the supervision of the judiciary and the armed forces. The PNA picked up the slogan of ‘Nizam-i-Mustafa’ to infuse religious fervor in the movement that it launched to remove Bhutto.

The call for establishment of ‘Nizam-i-Mustafa’ became a rallying point and the urban populations, especially the bourgeois classes, were mesmerized by the romanticism of the utopia offered.

The workers of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the pupils belonging to the madrassahs of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)) spearheaded the PNA agitation to remove Bhutto from power.

With the involvement of foreign hand, the movement gathered momentum and the government became ineffective in maintaining law and order. Even the use of troops failed to stop the processions chanting slogans of ‘Nizam-I-Mustafa’ that daily poured out from the mosques. As a last resort, Bhutto agreed to introduce ‘Islamic system’ in the country and announced ban on gambling, wine, floorshows and the like.

There was to be no more racecourse or nightclub culture in the country. He declared Friday ___ the Muslim equivalent of Sabbath ___ as the weekly holiday.

Bhutto’s announcement to introduce ‘Islamic’ measures was taken as his weakness and a last ditch effort to save himself. Ultimately, as a result of the negotiations that had been in progress, the PNA and the PPP came to terms on holding of fresh elections in October 1977.

The agreement to this effect was to be signed at noon on 5 July; but in the early hours of that date the Chief of Army Staff, General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq, imposed martial law on the country.

In his very first address to the nation on 5 July 1977, General Zia stated:

“I must say that the spirit of Islam demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proved that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.” [3]

General Zia had no qualms in exploiting the fair name of Islam for his political ends, i.e., survival at all cost; and JI had no scruples in supporting the most ruthless military ruler of Pakistan in his design to self-perpetuate himself.

In JI’s view, he was a messiah or Saladin destined to redeem the country that had gone astray after independence. With mosque and military as his constituencies, General Zia played havoc with the state institutions and the civil society during his eleven-year stint.

Commenting on General Zia’s rule, The Encyclopedia of Pakistan observes:

“In attempting to restructure . . . state and society into a theocracy, the government undertook two kinds of initiatives:

First, measures designed to (be) subordinate to executive authority, institutions of state and civil society such as the judiciary and the press, which if allowed to function independently could check governmental power.